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The strike of about eighty thousand African gold liners in August 19<»A, the
third recorded strike involving African tinersi has 9 special place in the annals of
South African history. In Class and Colour in South Africa the Sinns'
of a chapter describing the events surrounding the strike, as does Ednard Roux> in his
Tiie longer than Rope.' Indeed) writes Dan O'Neara. the strike «as a
spend a good part
'•atershed event,"
separating one epoch of South African history froi another.'
O'Keara lakes tw> important points about the strike. Firstly, he notes that
even though it lasted for lerely five days. the strike unsettled the econoiy and
••perilled Ian and order to such an eitent that the Governtent leriously began to
reappraise its labour policies. In the lidst of the reappraisal case a change, as it
»ere, in government, alien in 1948> the National Party took poner.
muid have nothing of the freer labour urket countenanced by soie their predecessors—
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especially by those in the Oepartmt of Labour—and c u t down on the side of labour
regression and control.'
Secondly, O'Heara tritts that the strike literally ttdt the African Rational
Congress (ANC) sit up and coapelled it to take heed of the 6overment'f behaviour,
directed at the tiie by renomed liberal Deputy Pritt Minister Jan Hofteyr.* Eves though
the Boverntent's otn Lansdonn Cottission and Dtpartttnt of Labour «ere syapathttic to the
einers' grievances regarding nages and, despite the aide public support given to the
tintri' cauwi the Sovermtnt nevertheless repressed the strike.* The strikei and eass
Ktiont eade an iepression on the younger generation of M C eMbersi iho, in any case
•ere disenchanted with the elitist pttifionery politics of the AKC's old guard. The 1 W
Program of Action and the tovetcnt of the younger activists into leadership positions
took the ANC into a decade of tass campaigns and passive resistance) in the 1930s.
In suit O'Heara's account places an enoreous burden of historical responsibi-
lity on the lfW strikt. Little is offered, h o m e r , by nay of ciplaining the strike's
social and econoiic origins. O'Neara cssples the strike to tfee deterioration of tkt
African Reservtst the svfesistence bast of the eigrant laetur tysteti and to the surging
nar-tiie industrial trade unionist experienced in the Hitutersrand. But there is little
dociittntation on tht social and econoiic processes of gold lining proper Ktitre, after
all, the strike took place. It is in response to this void in historical docutentation
that tht present essay directs its attention.
To witt about origins and causes is a difficult atd tomhat hazardous underta-
king. Historical causation is, at best, .difficult to ntasliski and rfttn n a n d e w
' Ban O'Heara, 'The 19W African Hint workers' Strike'I page 1M.
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to a latter of arguient. In this »riting origins refer to those econoiic and social
processes in gold lining nhiclt brought about a confrontation b e t n m the African dine
Workers Union, representing African linersr and the Charter of Hinesi representing line
ouners. These processes are the custoiary concerns of political econoiy, having to do,
i
aiong other thingsi Hitti labour supplies, the labour process! profit urginsi capital
accumulation and state-capital relations. Too crude perhaps a nay of putting the issue,
these processes, and the individuals involved in ttiei, created the dynaiic froi and in
which the strike of August 1946 played itself out.
1!
Migrant labour, the gold lining industry's tanner of so rcing its African
labouri is a very stable and reliable leans by ahich annual coipleient!
are delivered to the lines. Its success is due to the fact that the in ustry draws on not
a single but lultiple sources of supply, and is able to increase suppl
•hen another stions a decline. David Vudelian and Alan Jeeves likens
systei to an eipirei able to sustain itself as long as there is root fi
Yudelian and Jeeves also nets, homveri that ttie overa
•igfant labour systei veils another aspect of the systei which. "ly contrast! has
exhibited considerable fluctuation. The lines could never count for 1 ng on the reliabi-
lity of their"individual sourcesof Ion »age labour.'7 During the
• labour supplies froi individual sourcing areas vent through fai
initiating rtiat turned out to be a long transition period froi doustic
foreign labour sourcing. In the 1930s, a lajority of ligrants Here
of African labour
es froi one source
the iigrant labour
ir expansion.'
1 stability of the
1930s and 1940s,
ly lajor changes,
labour sourcing to
iourced froi nithin
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South Africa. By the 1960s, domtic m n H supplied t linority of ligrairts.
As tn oddt alaost sisleading, prelnds to tin longer-ten decline in domtic
sourcing, the lines eiperienced a boo* in local labour supplies during : the late 1930s.
Betaeen 1936 and 1940, local labour supplies increased froi 235 392 to 390 433 aigrants,
a tttnty-three percent increase.* Foreign sources of supply increased aarginaJly, so
Mat the bulk of tin overall increase can frot domtic sources. Evidently pleased Kith .
the upturn of the aigrant labour aarket, the president of the Chattar of Bines, P.M.
Anderson, H S heartened by 'the success ehich have attended our efforts in conneiin litft
> the upply of dative labrar . . . . " TKe sining intatry'i Native Recfriting Corporation
(IRC)i responsible for doiestic recruiting, bed done tell during t»t period leading up
the Second Uorld liar. During the Mr, honever, tae supply of domtic labour dKlined
significantly.
The Konoiic constijinnces of tht aar considerably altered the tining industry's
cosfetitive position in the lakour aariet. tocrniteairl levels fret domtic sources fell
. as sharply during the early lHOs as they increased during the late 1930s. Frot the lfW
high of 290 433 aigrants, rtcruiterrt «as doM to 185 658 in 19M, 177 717 in 1947, a
dKline of thirty-six and thirty-nine percent respectively." Labour supplies frea
domtic sources had not been this loa for quite a anilei 'He have eiperienced
considerable difficulty . . . in uintaining an adequate laboar supply' coaplained the
president of the Charter."
The «ar, in effect, crHted a labour shartage in the liiing iotostry.
Indsstrial cipansion, stiaolated in part by Mr-tut condition, and the growth of
• See Figure 1.
• Transvaal Charter of Nines (TQI), Animal Report, (Jehameseurg! 1944)1 page 63.
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defense, itorks, created tore and higher paying eiployient for African norkers in the
cities.1* African labour, as one wrald expect, floied n r « readily into unufacturing
industry rather than the poorer-paying gold, lining industry.11 Africans frot South Africa
and the High Couission Territories also enlisted in the British Iiperial iilitaries. To
encourage enlistunt, the British High Couissioner requested froi the Chatter of Dines a
suspension of recruiting activities in the High Omission Territories. Recruiting u s
suspended in Saaziland, Lesotho and Botsnana on July 1 1942 only to be resuied in all
i
three territories by February 1943.1* Finally, good rainfall and harvests in 1943 choked
labour flow to cities and affected ligration to the lints, if only for the particular
harvesting season in that particular year.19
In order to sake up for the shortfall of African labour froi dotestic sources, the
Uitiatersrand Native Labour Association (Herala)i the agency responsible for the
recruiting of foreign labour! turned its attention to Kozaibique and central Africa.
Recruiting in Hozaibigue i»s governed by tens laid dom by the Hozaibique Convention of
1928 ahich set upper and loiter liiits to the nuttier of Kozaibicans: periitted to mirk in
the lines. The Charter of Nines das not allomd to eiploy tore than 80 000 or less than
45 000 Nozarticans at any one tin. The arrangement held froi 19SB to 1936, at nhich
tin the uiiiui u s increased to 90 000. It u s increased! once again, to 100 000 in
1940 but »htn the Charter requested another increase in 1942, it Das turned dom. The
request Has a statement of optiiisi and intent, since Nozartican labour fluctuated
i of any uior inbetneen 70 006 and 80 000 during the 1940s, shoving no sign i creases! and
'• TCHi Gold Producers Couitteei Stateients of Evidence, Statistics and Hetorandai
submitted to the Mit»atersrand Hine Natives Uao.es Emission, (Johannesburg: TCN, June 1943.)
11
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certainly not of the order sufficient to coepensatt for the shortages on the South African
side of the labour aarket.'*
Kith regards to central and south-central Africa, theie mre closed to
recruiters since 1913 for health reastns.>r Itortality rates: ateng central Africans etre
to the gpverneent airii to son degree tti» Charter of IBDH, unacctptaftly high." thus,
their contribution to the ceapleient of line labour awonted to 3 374 io 1934." The
Charter of Nines persuaded the governatnt in 1933 to allot a stall nueher of central
African eiders to wrt in the lines on an eiperiatnta! basis. After the Charter produced
evidence of an ianrovetent in their health statistics, recroitatnt prxeeded nithont
iaoediatnt froi 1937 onwards." A heavy deeand for African enlistimt in the «ar effort
resulted in a temporary suspension of recruiting in Zartia, Halui aad northern tttSMM
in \VA andi after one year, rxniting MS rented in Halwi and northern.btmu iith
Nalaai loosing a quota restriction of S 000 tincre in 19*3, 8 000 in 19U." Despite
the interruption and rtstrictinsi the saatly of central and tttth-central African lakttr
increased frot 3 374 in 1934 to 31 907 by 19*4." The increne, In t t i i short tert,
'• 9»ila van der Horst, native Labour in South Africa. (Londont Diford Univtnity
Press, 19U); page 220. Simn E. KatteneUenbogen. South Africa and Southern Hoiartinuel
Labour. Railwvs and Trade in the Ha«iiH of a Relationship. Itaxhesten The University
Press, 1982)f pages 1M-1H. TCR, Amwal Report, llohatnesburg: 19UII page SO.
17
 Sheila van der Horst, totive Labour in South Africil page 221.
l
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Hhile significant* did not take up for the shortage created by thi
supplies.
sluip in doiestic
The shortage oas nupounded by the absence of about five percent of the ahite labour
force, volunteers released by the Charter for the »ar effort. The colour bar and union
dosed shops prevented the Oiaiber frot using African and non-unionizM >hite labour in
place of the absentees. Given the political risks involved in tampering nith white
etployient securityi the Chaiber of Dines did not challenge the colour bar nor the dosed
shops, though they cotpliintd about these racial tonopolies constantly. Partly as a
result) the cothined shortage of African and unite labour put considerable pressure on
the lines - to uintain production levels Kith reduced torkforcesj and to develop
strategies of increasing the productivity of labour.
Ill
In 1937, an assistant eine ianager at the Sub-Nigel line by the nate of R.B. Start
i
•
presented a paper on line wchanization to the annual letting of the Association of Nine
Danagers of the Transvaal. (AhUT)." 'As the supply of native labour i available for the
lines decreases') he argued) 'it Mill becote necessary to obtain the s u e or greater
production Kith fever natives."* Start advocated techanization as a panacea for the
labour shortage and as a solution to the productivity problei. In support of his argutent
he claited that the techanization of stope-deaning> development
transportation doubled the output in attracted ore at Sub-Nigel) using half of the nortal
cotpletent of African labour." One other tiner the Van Dyke> explicitly followd the
cleaning and ore
n
 R.B.Snrt, 'Dechanization Applied to Dining in Relation to Native Labour on the
Suh-Nioel.' Paaers and Discussion. 1937-1938. IJohannesburgi TCD and AMIT, 1939).
•• R.B.Start, 'Dechanization Applied to Dining>':page 319.
a
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eiatple of Sub-Nigel, and reported a ttenty pircent increase in output.**
The Sub-Nigel and Van Dyke wrr the tost developed ami exceptional nupla of a tore
general process of litited sechanization taking place in the gold lining industry at the
tite. During the late 1930s, the tines began to use Kchanical scrapers in stopes and
stope-gullies to retove blasted rock frot the aorkface. Usually a lamiili labour-
intensive Jirocesji stopt-tleaning becate uch tort efficient and the overall productivity
gf labour—teasured in tern of ore output per person per year—increased by about ten
percent." In his witing on technological progress in deep level lining, H. tagntr of
the Chatter of Nines notes that this tas the second tost significant technological
development in the history of gold lining-the first nas the introduction of reciprocating
rock drills in the 1910s.** This developtent u s nott honever, an explicit response to
the labour shortage! but part of a tore general process of technological change in the
1930s. The unagers of Sub-Nigel and Van Syk argued that it ought to be a response to the
labour shortage and advocated large-scale techatization of tint tork. The techanizition
of stope-cleaningi one of essentially four phases of lining, tas telcott out too litited,
they argued.
There aas enough capital around to fund large-seal* Mthanizatiosi especially during
the late 1930s! nhicti tere very profitable years, fewer, capital MS invested in Hit
developtent of t«o net anas, the so-called Bat Hits, line and Klerksdorp in the Orange
Frn State.** As the beginning of the testers and southern eipansion of the industry) 15
" H.F. Tnotas, IUnao.tr of Van Dyk,- rnp tns* to R.B. Start, Pwurs l td D i t t im i im .
1942-ms, Volutt a, (lohanntsburgi TOI and AIWT, 19W)| page 334.
•* H. Hagner, 'The Challenge of Deep-Level Hining in South Africa* ' Journal of Wat
South African Institute of Hinino and Httallurovi (Septttber 19B4II pate 382.
- i b i d . .
•* John Lang, Bullion Johamnsburni Hen, Hints ind tht Chillewnt of Conflict.
(Johannesburg) Jonathan Ball, 1986); page 3S1.
new lines «Bre opened and 83 ne» shafts «ere sunk in 1936." Though the «ar delayed the
developtent of the (especially Orange Free State) deposits, capital M S couitted to and
development proceeded at a reduced pace of »hat m r e considered to be very exciting
prospects by the industry.
Thus, for the industry as a atiolei outnard eipansiorr das preferred to largt-sralt
inward techanization. And, as Yudeltan and Jeeves also note, the Mjority of lines did
not lecnanize because they expected in any case the labour situation to norialize." Of
course, sow of. the lines rare beyond iechanization> either because they w r e too old or
didn't have nich life left, or both. Unetever the particular reason in particular
circuistances, a Mjority of the lines did not explicitly invest in lechanization as a
solution to the problei posed by the labour shortage. j
The other approach to the productivity problei »as scientific tanagettnt, advocated
by I.S. Ford, the general lanager at Langlaagte. Ford and his colleagues from Dagga-
fonteini East Rand Propriety Hints (ERfN) and Kodderfontein B. argued that African liners
nould w r r harder if lanagetent treated thei better and if the norking environtent »as
•ade lore hiuant.** Ford nas particularly adaiant about changing utiat one could call a
racially despotic labour process. Racist in the wrkplace u s an iipeditent to greater
productivity and southing had to be done about it, Ford argued.
Ford's colleagues froi Daggafbntein, ERPM and Hodderfontein
CDunseli "A large percentage of labour,' I). V. Glathaar, assistant underground janager at
Daggafonteiiii noted, 'is due to the orong attitude, unfair tetrads and arroganti
' ibid
" David Vudelian and Alan Jeeves, "The Closing of the Frontier,' age 13.
B. underscored his
1
 J.S. Ford, 'Scientific Hanagwent »ith particular application
Bold Hine>' Papers and Discussion, W 2 - 1 M 5 , Volute !• (Johannesbufg: TCN and AHHT,
19*8)1 page B7B.
to a Hitnttrsrand
blustering nays of soee officials toiards nrkun.*** Lndtrehip too often, he continued,
"•ade U M of such factors as dotinnrin) powri overbearing exercise of authority,
dennd for absolute obedience. ••* 6. Hildick-Siith, the general tanager of Hodderfontein
9., described the white underground official « i "nigger-driver.' the type nho assuns
that "the native is inherently stupid."" And, indeed, 'boss boys and other natives
dressed in a little brief authority tend to apt their superiors, and so the abortive
eethod of labour control U recapitulated ... .•"
The issue for the* u s not the substance but the style am) tanner of tenaoerial
authority. Steeped in racisii coercioft and, quite often, reliant on physical violence,
the tanagerial tradition tilitated against the adoption of utiat »eri, after all, in this
setting, quite outrageous ideas, (tare of this reality, and keen to see hit ideas
accepted by the broader nnagerial stiff! Ford trintd the concept of scientific
•anagetent to siiply encoipass so-called uritten standard practice.** He explained: 'it
is the duty of unageients to.lake a coterttttniivt study of all underground wrt and ...
to lay doan uritten standard practice instructions for the perforttnci of every tast.'**
The hard, technocratic side of scientific aanagrtent Ford thought nould rin over
•anageeent. The softer, huHnistic side he kne» M S a dear loser.
Ford and his colleagues took thnselvts seriously enough and ieelMcnted uritten
standard practice. By 1941 all the institutions of uritten standard practice—the study
** U.V.61athaar, Papers and Discussion. 19«-19«, Volute a, IJohumnburgt TDI and
mi, 1949); page 906.
«»• ibid
1 8
 S. Hildick-Stith, Papers and Discussion. 194J-W5, VBIUK i, (Johannesburg! TOI
and AIIIIT, 1949); page 987.
I.S. Ford, 'Scientific Ranageient.' page 881.
ibid.
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departient, tiie-and-iDtion studies, the. training schools—were in place and functioning
i
at langlaagte, ERPili Oaggafontein and Hodderfontein 8.** Ford its the proud author of
the training lanualt coipiled after hours and eonths of intensive! observation) note-
i
taking and writing. The key-wrd M S standardization, and Ford sipected his workers to
i
knot the written instructions in detail. As to its success as strategy Font had little
doubt! 'By the application of written standard practice instruction the underground.
efficiency has increased in alnst all branches and is still iaprsvim
A third response to the labour shortage M S a corcern for tighter supervision) or as
it mscalled) 'lore intelligent supervision' ofthe African workforce.*' In practice
'•ore intelligent supervision' aiounted to a tore efficient systet of labour checking.
African workers underground had to be eonitored tore carefully) the tanagers froi these
lines argued, for they often were paid for work not perforitd.** The surface checking
station and the so-called underground native checker, introduced at four lines in 1934,
becan a popular fori of tonitoring the work-tite African workers spent underground. The
purpose of the surface checking station) the general iinager of Hest Springs eipleined,
was to 'give » central point for the control of native gang strengths and ... it affords a
leans of recording native tiie.*** The underground native checkeri known colloquially as
a fokkiei 'visits each working place in the section and checks the gang, job muter and
•* J.S.Fordi 'Scientific Hanagtttnt,1 and responses) Pacers and Discussion. 1942-
19«, Volute Si pages 97B-927.
' l.S. Ford) 'Scientific (lanagetenfi page 881.
page 331.
*' l.A. 8ecking> response to R.B. Surt> Papers and Discussion.
*• J.B.U. Couperthwaite, general lanager of Hest Springs,
Underground Native Labour at Hest Springs, Lilited' Papers and D
Voluie 2.
*» OP citi page 789.
1948-1945, VOIUM l\
Surface Checking of
scussion. 19U-19M,
class of aork of every boy in the section.1" By H W i at lent 14 of the 44 tins used
either the surface checking station or thi underground nttivi checker, or both."
It is difficult to assess thi iaoact of these approach*! on the processes of writ
for every line. On the nhole the industry reported a ten percent gain in output per
wrker over the period 1935 to 1945, but it is problematical to attribute the gains to
any one or any particular lit of the three approaches.** But aside of the gains claiatd
daiied by the industry on the level of production! there »as another diffusion of soie
significance to the process. For African aorkers—and probaily unite sorters—the
unagerial responses to the labour shortage and productivity problem becaw a source of
grievance, best illustrated by the events at langlaagte> hoie of J.S. Ford's witten
standard practice.
Tonerds the end of 1942 African liners, acting on o«n initiative, staged sit-donn
strikes and engaged the Langlaagte Mnageient in a series of confrontations. On January &
i
1943 underground aorkers fro* Block B Coipound called a anting to «bich J.S. Ford H t
sunoned. 'In a roody and insolent tanner ... the lachine boys ... put their coipliints,"
asoamftat ruffled Ford noted." Their cosylaints had everything to do «ith Hit litnar
process under witten standard practice. The liners protested against) Duftbar hoodie
r i t e s , the fact that they had to mrk double, even treble shifts, and that they
received insufficient renneration for overtiae. They also coiplained about unageient's
M
 S.B. Batty, general lanager of Sub-Nigelt response to CouptrthMite, Pacers and
Discussion. I H H « ! i page 797.
** J.6.U. Coupertlwaite. 'Surface Checking of UndergrouMl Native Labour'! oajes 7B9-
809.
" H Magnet, 'The Challenge of Deep-Level Mining in South Africa1! page 38E.
•' 11/1/1W, NTS 7a75. 102/332 loepartient of Netivt Affairs: Transvaal Archives.
Pretoria.) Cited by Dunbar Hoodie. 'The Role of the State in Industrial Conflict! Die
1940s liar Years.' INea York: unpublished ass. 1985>; page 12. See also his coapanion
essay. 'The Moral Econoiy of the Nine and the African Nine Workers Union: The 1940s Bine
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IE
requirement that a leasuring string to be used aith lachine drills, that they be able to
recite underground aorking regulations by the nuibers of' the paragraphs and) failing
utiichi they nere liable to violent assault.** Ford heard the* outi proiised to leet:
Kith the liners again, this tiie aith Colonel Horak of the Mitaatersrand Police, in case
he «as needed.** But Ford insisted that 'learning institutions and tht string ... had
been used for the past five years and Has in the interest of the African/00
In the eventi five hundred liners aere arrested during the Langliagte disturbances
and had to stand trial. Nine lanageient and the police aere uncertain about ho» to
proceed, given the nuiber of liners involved and the fear of further disturbances if they
•ere all brought to trial. In the end the ringleaders aere tritd—partly at the
insistence, interestingly enough, of Colonel Horak of the Police—and defended by
counsel provided by the African Bine Uorkers Union (NNU). Everyone eicept eight
ringleaders nere re-e*ployed by the line.91
For the young AHMUi foried as recently as I°U> this vis valuable eipirienciv
For the first tin the liners' cause M S defended in a court of Wit a useful propaganda
platfori for the AHUU and a serviceable test of the latitude of the laa in relation to
liners' rights. The outcoie of the trial »as eiinently favourable and, as the AMM
provided counsel, gave it a credibility and standing it did not enjoy anng African,
liners before. After all, of the five hundred liners arrested) only eight «ere tried,
fined and dismissed froi their jobs. In a nor Id ahere lass disiissals and n s s
repatriation acre possible) this aai seen as a victory, even ttiougti
•• Dunbar Hoodie, 'The Sole of the State in Industrial Conflict'! page 12
•• Brink sen, il/l/W, NTS 7475, 102/332. Cited by Ounbar Hoodie,
State in: Ineustriai Conflict'; page 12.
the MIIIU aas not
•The Role of the
90
 The Suaroian, 21/1/1943. Cited in Sunbar Hoodie, 'The Role of the State in
Industrial Conflict"; sage !S. |
91
 Dunbar Hoodie, 'The Role of the State in Industrial Conflict1;
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responsible for it.. -; • ,
IV
All of tht gold lines provided African iineri «ith thiir daily teals. The Mils rare
prepared in CDapound kitchens and served to Africans in cstpound dining hills, in i
ftshion approaching thi decorue of a prison. One of the reasons «hy the lining industry
undertook this responsibility M S to ensure that on the average writers retained fit for
the rigours of underground aininq.** It certainly u s not a cheeper fort of fwd
provision."
The diet consistently eainly of tarew—a taize based grual—and m t t eith lttser
quantities of beans, vegetables) bread, beer and other tore limr itets rounding off
tit annul supply of food.** For eiaeplti in 19Wi the avtrigt Africa* liner receive*
600 pounds of aaiie, 830 pounds of icati 80 pounds etch of breed and vegetable** M
pounds of beans am) beer derived froe 90 pounds of ult.** Cottared to tint supplies and
the mue, the cost of these food supplies N S * hoeevtri a relatively linor iteti
taking up three percent of eerting costs.
Dine tanagers eere nevertheless encouraged to be penurious in this regard, is part
of the overall, attctpt to keep wrking costs does.** Mine u m g e r s nere quite awrt if
the fact however that a reduction in food supplies eould be cause of dissatisfaction in
the coepnmds and for this reason diieissed any ttmght of deliberate cuttacts. In
response to one such a proposal tendered at the 1939 annul testing of the AWT» B.I.
•* Francis Hilsoni labour in the Swth African field Mneel pege 57.
"iiii
«» See Figure 6.
• • See Figure 6.
• * TOli Annual Resort. (1941)1 page 47.
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Bushelli general lanager of Best Springs cautioned that 'if the wight of solids Here,
reduced to that suggested ... there nould be serious coiplaints in the coipounds."" On
this issuei the line ianagers and:> indeed, the coipound lanagers stood firily against
any deliberate pruning of African diets.
They had good reason to be careful. Food m s an enornusly sensitive latter in the
coipounds; African liners did not need iuch persuasion to stage food riots. If any
savings « r e to be without luch fussi it Mas in the area of food preparation) and a
reduction in the aiount of food Hasted daily. This is nfiat line ianagers frot 6overnient
Dining Areas, Durban Roodepoort. Harievale and Uest Springs advocated in their paper
presented at the flIWT leetings in 1939 and 194O. M The lodernization of the coipound
kitchen> the rationalization of food preparation, these they felt nuld do the trick.
They reported significant savings in food costs following the mdernization of their food
preparation facilities.9*
The probleii as it turned out, c u e froi the farnrs. In 1943 a poor harvest
reduced the quantity of uize and as a result larew served to African liners.40 1944
registered a slight iiproveieht but the quantities Here reduced even further in 194S and
19*6. Hhereas the average African liner received about 660 pounds of laize in l?40i in
1943 it Has dom to 550 pounds, 550 in 1944. A reduction in staple food, do»n froi
quantities to utiich the African liner had becoie accustoied, «as cause for grievances
•hich even the Chaiber of Nines and the line managers could not regard as illegitimate.
Heat supplies also declined in 1944 but then slonly iiproved to the 1943 level by
TCH, AHHT, Papers and Discussion. L939-194U page 606.
TCH, AHHT, Papers and Discussion, 1939-1940! pages 598-404.
ibid.
TCD, Annual Beoort, (1943)! page 24.
19W.*» To nke up for the declinei thi Charter of flints imported frozen and canned m t
froi East Africa in quantities that could not. hoaever, like up for the stortfal l .**
The African liners nere not particularly pleased nith the food prepared froe frozen and
canned H i t . Neither Here they pleased aith the increased quantities of vegetables—
particularly beans—and bread served in an attcest to substitute for the shortage of n i ze
ant m t . M
Concerned about the possible consequences of the food shortage, the Charter of Dines
responded by( on the one hand, explaining to the mrkers that the situition M S mt the
industry's fault but caused by forces outside, its control, "national shortages and
restrictions on the supply of essential foodstuff) such as teat and Hize, hive nde i t
necessary to adjust the norial ration s c a l e . . . , 1 the president pointed out in 19« . * *
The Department of Native Affairs M S spKificil ly asted to piece pesters In the coeeomds
eiplaining to wrkers that the food shortage M S I national l i t ter i brought about by
conditions of Mr and draught."
Da the other hand the Charter of nines criticized the. givfrnmt's agricultural
policies, regarding as unsound the practice of support' pricing. In a bitter eichuge of
letters betwen the Charter and the Departient of Agriculture, a cue is eide against
govtrmcnt intervention in the food nrket and in favour of free trade and urket
detereined pricing. ' I feel that I at justified in uttering a aord of naming,1 the
president of the Charter of Bines noted in cost unusuil tone of language, 'to those in
authority rtoi in the control of coeeodities and the regulation of food lupplies.
" See Figure 6.
••• TCH, Annual Retort. (19*»>l pige 87.
M
 Din O'Niiri) 'The 19*4 African Nine Nerkers' Strike*f page 15?.
M
 TCR. Animal Retort. 11942)1 page SO.
* • TCH, Annual Report. I IMS)! page 26.
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aili alien liking their determinations, to realize the possible repercussions
on the vast labour force in our care.*** In their correspondence of July 14 1145 to
December 14 19*5, the Chaiber first politely, then aggressively requests of the
Department of Agriculture to reiove agricultural price supports." The Oepartunt,
concerned for political reasons about the prosperity of faning constituencies! politely
and firtly refused."
Unable to control the supply and price of agricultural conodities, the Chaiber of
Hines and fine lanageient lived through the years of the food shortages nitti considerable
angst. Indeedi 1945, the year prior to the strike, u s 'for coipound lanagers and
their staff ... full of anxiety."*' They nere referring to rioting in the coipounds
resulting froi the food shortages. There is son uncertainty as to nhen the rioting
started, but the Chattier of lines recorded its first food disturbance on f February 1945
at Harievale> to which the Nigel police attended." At East fieduld, in the sate lonth,
'certain Basuto Natives had refused to draa food at the proper tiles. By the tin the
Police reached the coipounds the Natives rare quiet and in their roots, and they dren
food later."1 At first it appeared as if the situation u s under control, thanks or no
thanks to the police.
Hore food disturbances «ere reported at Brootvlei, Eoverntent 6old Mining Cotpany,
«• TCH, Annual Report, (1943); page 51.
47
 Correspondence of the Chaiber of Nines and the Destrtient of Agriculture, 14 July
to 14 Deceritr 1945. Reprinted in TCH, Annual Report, (1945)1 pages 84-94..
» TCH, Annual Report, (19451! pages 95-94.
" TCH, Annual Report, (1945)1 page 45.
*• TOli Bold Producers Couittee (6PC)i 'Native Labour-Native Trade Unions-Strike.'
Unlisted source, Chaiber of Nines archives. (19*5, np.) Note that Narievale «as one of the
tines nhich nderniied its kitchens.
71
 TCH, GPCi 'Native Labour-Native Trade Unions-Strike's np.
Van Ryn Estate in February l?*5i and> on Harcb 6. at IMderfontein East 'arising frot i
coiplaint about issues of earew . . . a Nativi had t i n killed Md another had since died
of injuries.'7* Natters had indeed become • little desperate. In January 19W. atone
(unknoan) line, "the line aanager told the wrkers that there Mt not enough food oving
to the drought . . . . ' " The einers replied by 'raiding the compound kitchens and (ate)
all the fond."* Kore food riots w e reported in the newspapers for the months Harth and
April of that year.™
Jhe food disturbances w e a direct result of Mize and etat ihortages, and they
•ere the organized responses of einerS) acting on their om initiative. The MW seized
upon the issue, and. in altost every speech eadei every pamphlet producedi the utter of
food featured prominently.7* Betaeen the food riots and the August 19*4 strike! the AINU
turned the food issue into a union issue, and made one of tkt demands leading up the
strike that einers be pereitted to feed thetselves one of the major demands of that year.
Siven the importance of food to the eineni and given their iteediate history of trying
to do southing about food shortages by rioting, the MIW caold net g» far «r«ng rMinj
the issue ai something to strike over.
In the 1930s and I W H - H indeed before and after this period-the international
gold market functioned under a relatively constant and stable gold price. A fine ounce of
n
 TCI*. GfC, 'Kative Labour-Nativt Trade Uniom-Strike'l np.
" Inkululekot 28 Jinotry 19Ut piee S.
7
» ibid
71
 See Inkululeko. Hard) and April editions. 19461 page S of every edition.
" See Dunbar Hoodie. 'The Koral Economy of the Nine and the African Nine Uorkers
Union.'
gold «as valued at 7.01 pounds sterling, in 1936, increased to 8.4 pounds in 19*0 and 8.62
pounds in 19*6. Only in 1950 did the price increase sharply, relative to the trend, to
I2;M pounds per fine ounce.77 The price Mas set independently of producer cost, «hid>
•eant that any increases in the costs of production could not be passed on to consumers
and had to be absorbed internally. On the other hand, the deeuid for gold at this tin
Das virtually liiitless. The consuiers—tostly government reserve banks—nere Killing to
buy all the gold that c u e on to the larket.71
These facts are of importance siiply because, on the one hand, the industry could
never overproduce and hid an interest in utilizing, output. A consequence of the
shortfall of African labour discussed earlier Has that it could not laintiin its annual
output) never iind increase it. Betiteen 19*1 and 19*7 ore production fell by fourteen
•illion tons Ifroi 67.25 to 53.71 lillion) and gold bullion three tillion fine ounces.
The level at nhich gold bullion dropped Das larginally greater than that of the ore. as a
result of the declining quality or grade—insured in gold deii-wights per ton of treated
ore—of the lined ore.7* The industry's prior couititnt to and investient in Ion-grade
lining operations iade a shift to higher-grade lining over this short ten difficult. In
a wrld of liiitless deiand for gold, less ore of declining quality lent less gold to be
sold and, as a result) less revenue accumulated.
In itself, declining output «as not such a bad thing> for the industry still
recorded reasonable output.10 Bhat «as tore mrrisoee w s the escalation of turking costs
ihichi as they could not be transferred by price increases to the consumers, directly
™ TCII, Annual Report. 11950) i page 135.
7
*TiMthy Green, The Hen world of 6old. INwi York: Malker and Co., 1981)1
pages 18-80.
" S e e Table 1.
n
 See Table 1 and Figure 5.
ingested into revenues and profits. At their annual letting in 1941i K.H.A. LanrencBi
prHident of the Chatter of Nines, laeented that 'mrking costs have increased steadily
since the outbreak of »ir and. in the present abnorul circustancesi the likelyhood of
further increases cannot, be disregarded.1" In 19*3 the president felt that 'the
operations of the lines are tending to btcoie increasingly subject to ertarrasstent.1"
Indeedi the industry faced a siity-nint percent increase in writing costs during.the M r ,
a ten-fold increase over pre-nar nrking costs." This u s so alareing a trend that the
Charter of Nines named that lot grade lining operations mulit hive to ceaser a signal
usually aim) at governunt begging relief rather than a statement of fact.** Lou grade
lines did not dose dom during the nar.
The escalation in writing costs «as nevertheless real enough. It «as due uinly to
rise in the cost! of line supplies and equipienti the largest itct of aorking costs.
Shortages of these itns as mil as *ar induced inflation drove prices upi sharply ss
particularly after I9«. Unite.ugesi the second wst i^iortant ita of wrkigg costs,
also rose steadily during this periodi doubling in absolute terts betMtn ITU and
1950." These «ere a result of collective agreennts previously tidt, u mil u cost of
i
living increases iiposed upon the industry by government. Deitnds for nge increases
outside these arrangements «ere strenuously resisted by the Charter. African aages
retained relatively constant, except for a seventeen percent increase warded and paid
for by govermenti in response to the recoitendations of the Lansdom Conission in
•> TOI, Animal Broprt, ( m i l l page U .
" TCN, Annual Report. 11943)! page S .
n
 See Figure 4.
• * TCIt> Annual Rwort. ( lfW)f page 60.
•* See Figure 4.
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19*3."* Kith no recognized union and little bargaining pirner, African wrters «*tched as
their »ages iaprove slightly in absolute tens but decline in real tern. Finally*
doeestic shortages, and inflation drove up food prices, but since this u s a relatively
linor itei of wrking costs, its contribution to the increase of mrking costs u s
aarginal.
The net effect of a decline in output and a global increase in wrking costs nas that
by the eid-19Ws the profit eargin of the industry narrow) considerably. In 19M, the
heyday of labour abundance* the industry eade 3.51 pounds profit on every fine ounce of
gold produced. In 19« profita declined to 3.06 pounds, 2.29 pounds in m & and 1.08
paunds by 19*7, the leanest year of the decade." Biven the declining profit eargini
the Chaaber of Dines resisted absolutely any «age increases for African siners.
Ordinarily stubborn rfwa it cat* to African u g e increases, the ttaabtr in 19*Os
conducted a vigorous defense of its cheap labour policies. Froi its point of vie*, the
industry could not afford to have any vage increases for African einers. The stance
brought the Charter of Dines into conflict »ith the AINU, nfcose leaders and teeners
thought differently.
In 19*3 the Lansdonn Coatission recontnded M g t increases to African liners, but
the Cnatber of Nines successfully persuaded the 6ovennent that it could not afford the*
m l the 6overnient agreed to carry the cost.** Hoiner> only a part and not all of the
increasesnere" ararded to the tiners and it is this difference—i.e. betveen the
CoeBission'rreconendations and the actual awrda—that the AMU turned to its advantage.
The ADWI atunterpoised the Couission's rKonendations against the increases actually'
•» Set Figure •.
•* See Figure S.
n
 TCD. 6PC, Statwwnts of Evidence, Statistics and Denranda.
received and bland the Charter for mt taking op tilt difference.** A clever strategy)'
no doubti for it give the nge deitmfs the night of state legitiiacy. Aried «ith the
deaand for higher «agej and a different systei of food delivery, grievances generated by
the political econoiy of gold lining in the IWOSI the flhWI took about 80 000 liners into
an unprecedented strike on August IE 19Wi and probibly double tht mmber in
sympathizers. ,
' TQ1. 6PC, "Native Labour-Native Trade Uniom-StrikeM np.
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TABU 1
fold Production: 1936-1948
Year Tom Rilled Fine Oi. Srade
Outs/Ton
1936 48 221120 11013 776 4.569
1937 50 725 750 I I 329 397 4.462
1938 53 83*150 11 707 254 4.349
1939 S8 340 200 12 352 099 4.234
1940 64 515 350 13 535 504 4.196
1941 67 255 450 13 877 275 4.127
1942 66 979 700 13 572 339 4.053
1943 59 952 900 12 281 855 4.097
1944 58 504 400 11 992 717 4.039
1945 58 897 600 11 936 147 3.997
1946 56 927 500 11 645 646 4.024
1947 53 712 300 10 914 028 3.9B2
1948 55 285 700 I t 304 044 4.012
Source) TO), Annul Retorts, 11936-1948.)
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